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From near total destruction forty-one years ago, the Federal Repub-
lic of Germany has emerged as the fourth wealthiest industrialized na-
tion. Germany's gross national product exceeds $655.5 billion,'
economic expansion continues at a rate of almost 3% per annum,2 and
world leaders now look to Germany as the European economic locomo-
tive. Yet despite this wealth, the German capital markets 3 remain minis-
cule in comparison to those of other industrialized nations. In terms of
market capitalization, for example, the Frankfurt Exchange is only a
fraction as large as those of New York, Tokyo, Montreal, and London.'
This development has had a significantly adverse effect on the ability
of German companies to raise equity capital. The average Eigenkapital-
quote (stockholder equity rate) in German stock corporations has fallen
* Mr. Blum is currently associated with the law firm of Latham & Watkins in Washington,
D.C. He recently completed a fellowship granted by the Robert Bosch Foundation in the Federal
Republic of Germany, during which he worked on securities matters at the Bundesministerium der
Justiz (Federal Ministry of Justice) in Bonn.
I INFORMATION PLEASE ALAMANAC 195 (39th ed. 1986).
2 THE ECONOMIST, June 7, 1986, at 123.
3 There are eight German stock exchanges: Frankfurt, Dusseldorf, Berlin, Hamburg, Munich,
Hanover, Stuttgart, and Bremen. Of these, Frankfurt is the most important (accounting for 44% of
the total turnover in domestic shares, 84% of the domestic bonds, 57% of foreign shares, and 87%
of foreign fixed-interest securities) followed by Dusseldorf and Hamburg. Wegen, Federal Republic
of Germany, in INTERNATIONAL SECURITIES LAW AND PRACTICE 5 (J. Robinson ed. 1985).
4 In 1980, the market capitalization of the New York Stock Exchange amounting to $1.2 tril-
lion greatly exceeded the capitalization of the exchanges in Tokyo ($341 billion), London ($133
billion), Montreal ($113 billion), Frankfurt ($72 billion), Toronto ($67 billion), and Paris ($45 bil-
lion). INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR, Nov. 1980, at 197.
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from 35.8% in 1964, to 27.5% in 1977, to a dangerously low 18.5% in
1985.' Moreover, the total number of stock corporations is extremely
small and continues to decline: from 2,541 in 1964, to 2,149 in 1977, to
2,141 as of December 31, 1980.6 This trend is also reflected in the rela-
tively small number of German companies turning to the equity markets
to raise capital. In 1983, a mere dozen firms went public and a few of
these never made it further than the unregulated market.7 In 1984,
twenty corporations were added to the stock exchange listing while, in
1985, only a dozen corporations went public. Although the amount of
capital raised by these public offerings has increased in recent years, 8 it
remains far below the amounts raised in other industrialized markets.9
One explanation for the relatively weak development of the German
equity markets lies in the reluctance of Gesellschaften mit beschrdnkter
Haftung ("GmbHs") (limited companies) to convert to Aktiengesell-
schaften ("AGs") (stock corporations). In 1980, for example, there were
255,940 GmbHs (up from 39,000 in 1961) compared to 2,141 AGs
(down from 2,541 in 1964). This reluctance is based in part on the his-
torical desire of German businesses to retain as much control as possible
over their operations-the so-called Herr im eigenen Haus (masters in
their own home) philosophy. The much more burdensome disclosure
and reporting requirements placed on stock corporations also serve as a
deterrent to adopting the AG structure.?1 As a result, the vast majority
5 The stockholders equity rate is based on the proportion of stockholder equity to total corpo-
rate assets. J. JENKEL, DAS INSIDERPROBLEM IM SCHNITTPUNKT VON GESELLSCHAFTS-UND
KAPITALMARKTRECHT IN MATERIELL-UND KOLLISIONSRECHTLICHER SICHT 18 (1980)(citing
STATISTISCHEs BUNDESAMT, WIRTSCHAFT UND STATISTIK 784 (1978) and STATIs-rISCHEs
BUNDESAMT, WIRTSCHAFT UND STATISTIK 738 (1965)); Antwort der Bundesregierung auf den
Priifungsauftrag des Deutschen Bundestages zur "Verbesserung der Risikokapitalausstattung der
deutschen Wirtschaft" (Drucksache 10/1315) vom 6. Juni 1984, Deutscher Bundestag 10. Wahlperi-
ode, Drucksache 10/2881 (1985).
6 J. JENKEL, supra note 5, at 18 (citing STATISTIScHES BUNDESAMT, WIRTSCHAFT UND
STATISTIK 215 (1978) and STATISTISCHES BUNDESAMT, WiRTsCHAFT UND STATISTIK 188 (1965));
Kraus, Securities Regulation in Germany? Investors' Remedies for Misleading Statements by Issuers,
18 INT'L LAW. 109, 112 n.28 (1984).
7 Pohl, Die Placierung wird zurLotterie, SODDEUTSCHE ZEITUNG, Jan. 4, 1986, at 33, col. 5. In
contrast, there were 1,633 new issues and 888 initial public offerings in the United States in 1983.
See SECURITIES INDUSTRY YEARBOOK 1984-85, at 591 (B. van Dyk ed. 1985).
8 Capital raised through public offerings has increased from DM319 million in 1983, to
DMI.7226 billion in 1984, and to DMI.8125 billion in 1985. Pohl, supra note 7.
9 For example, the gross proceeds from equity issues floated on the United States markets in
1983 were $51.579 billion. SECURITIES INDUSTRY YEARBOOK 1984-85, supra note 7, at 591. Pro-
fessor Hopt sums up the current situation as follows: "[i]n Germany, the stock market is weak, the
number of new stock corporations is virtually nil, and there is little incentive to go public and to
have the shares of the company traded on the stock exchange." Hopt, Insider Trading on the Conti-
nent, 4 J. COMP. CORP. L. & SEC. REG. 379, 383 (1982).
10 See Aktiengesetz [AktG] § 177, BUNDESGESTZBLATT [BGBL] I 1089 (1965)(W.
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of German businesses remain as limited companies, never distributing
their shares to the public at large.
Another reason for the arrested development of the German stock
exchanges lies in the failure of the markets to attract and retain the small
German investor. In 1974, for example, only 0.7% of individual savings
were invested in stocks as compared to an average of 5.1% during the
period 1960 to 1969.11 It is estimated that, at most, 3.5 million Germans
own stock, while in the United States, a country four times the popula-
tion of Germany, the number is fifteen times as great. According to the
most recent figures, a remarkably small 200 German firms have more
than 1,000 stockholders, and only seventeen corporations have more
than 100,000 owners.' 2 In fact, in 1980 there were only 224 domestic
stock corporations listed on the Frankfurt Stock Exchange, the country's
largest. 13 The wide distribution of production capital which had been
hoped for simply has not come to pass in the Federal Republic.
The aversion of individual Germans to invest in equity securities can
be explained on a number of levels. First, many investors find that fixed-
rate bonds and similar securities provide equal if not better yields than
stocks, without the concomitant risk. Germans are also more risk averse
than, for example, their United States counterparts. Second, tax laws
and enforcement practices, particularly those allowing investors to retain
interest on bank and savings accounts de facto tax-free, make investing in
stocks less attractive. Finally, taxes on the purchase and sale of stock,
relatively high (fixed) broker commission fees, and the automatic with-
holding of a portion of the distributed dividends, combine to repel the
small investor from the stock market.
Another significant reason that many small investors in Germany
shy away from stock investments is the widely-held belief that the mar-
kets are, to some extent, "fixed;" in particular, that insiders and specula-
tors retain a significant advantage over the common investor.' 4 This
perception is enhanced by the numerous incidences of insider trading re-
Ger.)(German Stock Corporation Act). Stock corporations, in comparison to limited companies, are
also subject to significantly stricter controls on the composition and issuance of their annual reports,
rules protecting minority shareholder rights, requirements to hold shareholder meetings, increased
liability for managers and directors, and increased rights of workers to participate in the manage-
ment of the company (Mitbestinmung).
II J. JENKEL, supra note 5, at 18.
12 Pohl, supra note 7.
13 Id. In 1983, there were 442 (450 in 1982) domestic corporations quoted officially and semioffi-
cially on German stock exchanges, of which approximately 80 domestic shares were quoted semioffi-
cially. In 1983, 181 (182 in 1982) foreign shares were officially quoted on German stock exchanges.
Wegen, supra note 3, at 85.
14 J. JENKEL, supra note 5, at 18-19; DER SPIEGEL, Oct. 28, 1985, at 25-26.
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ported in the daily press. 5 Der Spiegel noted in October 1985, with re-
spect to the takeover by Daimler-Benz of AEG, that: "In fact, there are
already several other cases [in addition to the Daimler-Benz-AEG af-
fair] in which insiders have speculated with their information on the
stock exchange. The Board of Inquiry would be overwhelmed if it pur-
sued every clear suspicion."' 6
The purpose of this Article is to explore the German approach to
the regulation of insider trading. The Article begins with a discussion of
the structure and regulation of the German capital markets. Insider
trading is then defined, followed by a short history of the German atti-
tude toward such trading. The Article examines next the possibility of
regulating insider trading through actions under German civil and com-
mon law, followed by an in-depth analysis and criticism of the current
voluntary insider trading code. A short survey of the effectiveness of the
rules governing insider trading is then presented through two case
studies. The Article concludes with an evaluation of current efforts to
reform the insider trading rules, in particular through the harmonization
program of the European Economic Community ("EEC" or
"Community").
II. STRUCTURE OF THE GERMAN CAPITAL MARKETS
There are three types of securities markets in Germany: the German
stock exchanges for officially listed securities; the geregelter Freiverkehr
(semiofficial market for the regulated trading of unlisted securities); and
the ungeregelter Telefonverkehr (market for nonregulated, unlisted trans-
actions, i.e., those securities traded off the stock exchange by telephone
and not included in the other markets).
Only securities officially traded on the German stock exchanges are
subject to the rules of the Stock Exchange Act. 7 The regulated trading
of unlisted securities, despite the considerable market which exists, is
governed by no specific law, but is subject to the self-regulation of market
15 See, e.g., Waren in der Rheinstahl-spekulation Insider Engagiert? Die Welt, Feb. 28, 1973, at
12; Tetilaktien im Spekulationskarussell, Die Welt, Nov. 15, 1972, at 15; DER SPIEGEL, Jan. 18,
1971, at 34-35; DER SPIEGEL, Oct. 28, 1985, at 25-26; Insiderregeln, Handelsblatt, Mar. 26, Mar. 27,
Apr. 4, Apr. 15, May 7, & May 9, 1985.
16 Pohl, supra note 7. Dr. Ralf Wojtek notes that empirical evaluations of the frequency of
insider trading are almost nonexistant. He concludes, however, that in light of the suspicions con-
stantly reported in the daily press, one can draw the conclusion that the abuse of nonpublic informa-
tion in securities transactions is not a rare occurance. R. WOJTEK, INSIDER TRADING IM
DEUTSCHEN UND AMERIKANISHCEN RECHT 15-16 (1978).
17 Bdrsengesetz [BorsG] (1908), REICHSGESETZBIATT [RGBL] 215. amended by BGBL.I 1013
(1975).
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participants.18 Similarly, trading in nonregulated, unlisted securities is
subject only to limited control and supervision by market participants.
Examination of the quality of securities before they are included on the
dealers' price list is little more than rudimentary. Prices in this market
are posted in daily private newsletters.
The Stock Exchange Act, which was last revised in April 1975, gov-
erns the licensing of persons admitted to the exchanges, the organization
of the exchanges, the admission of securities and commodities for trade,
the settlement of exchange transactions, trading in futures, and the re-
sponsibilities of market participants. The stock exchanges also promul-
gate their own trading rules, including nonbinding recommendations
made by informal committees and working groups. The Stock Exchange
Act contains absolutely no reference to or regulation of insider trading.
Under the Exchange Act, the stock exchanges are established as in-
stitutions of public law administered by bodies of the exchanges them-
selves. The admission of securities for trading is subject to the approval
of the Zulassungsstelle (Admissions Board), at least half of whose mem-
bers may not be professionally engaged in securities brokerage. Quota-
tions are fixed by Kursmaklers (publicly-appointed exchange specialists).
Exchange activities are subject only to the supervision of the Ldnder
(states) and specially appointed state commissioners. There is no agency
in Germany, either at the federal or Ldnder level, which is at all compa-
rable in authority or resources to the United States Securities and Ex-
change Commission ("SEC").
Although there is no law requiring the registration of securities in
connection with a public offering, the Stock Exchange Act does require
the filing of a prospectus for officially listed stocks. The prospectus must
be published at least three days prior to the admittance of the issue for
trade on the exchange.19 The Admissions Board, although required to
ensure that the prospectus is complete, is not called upon to attest to the
18 The listing of a security on the semiofficial market is decided by a panel comprised of market
participants. Trading is conducted within the stock exchanges in accordance with rules established
by the Federal Association of German Banks. The regulation of these unlisted transactions is there-
fore completely in the hands of the securities dealers. This market is not covered by the safeguards
of the Stock Exchange Act. Publication of a prospectus is not compulsory, and there is no statutory
liability for the correctness and completeness of a prospectus, should one be issued. Prices are not
fixed by independent, government-supervised persons. In short, trade in the semiofficial regulated
market lacks any genuine statutory or outside control. See Schwark, Regulation of the German
Capital Markets, I J. COMP. CORP. L. & SEC. REG. 299, 309-10 (1978).
19 Kraus, supra note 6, at III (citing BiirsG §§ 17, 36(3)(c), & 38). For a detailed description of
prospectus and other issuing requirements, see Notification of Admission of Securities (Zulassung-
sbekanntnachung) for Official Quotation of July 4, 1910, translated in Wegen, supra note 3, at
104-06.
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accuracy of the prospectus with regard to the financial and narrative in-
formation.2" Consequently, disclosure in connection with a public offer-
ing usually occurs only when the issuer is concurrently seeking to list the
security on an official stock exchange.2 Unlisted securities traded on the
regulated and unregulated markets, which constitute the bulk of German
stocks, are most often issued without the publication of a prospectus.
Corporations issuing unlisted securities which do not fall under the
purview of the Stock Exchange Act are subject only to the Aktiengesetz
(Stock Corporation Act), which governs all corporations.22 The Corpo-
ration Act, however, was not designed to regulate the issuance and trad-
ing of securities, but to outline the responsibilities of corporate officers
and directors and to establish the rights of shareholders. It offers only
very limited protection to a securities investor.
In short, the Stock Exchange Act provides only limited regulation
for the issuance and trading of German securities, and then only for
those several hundred stocks officially listed on the stock exchanges. It is
within this regulatory framework that the German approach to insider
trading is considered.
III. INSIDER TRADING DEFINED
Insider trading occurs when an individual who has access to mate-
rial, nonpublic information-an "insider"-trades or causes the trade of
securities based on that information. It is through the subsequent public
disclosure of this information, which typically has a significant effect on
the value of the securities, that the insider is able to make a profit or
avoid a loss either personally or for a third party. Insider trading is con-
sidered today to be undesirable by most legislators, courts, and commen-
tators because it undermines the equality of opportunity among
investors. This, in turn, erodes investor confidence, thereby threatening
the proper functioning of the stock markets.23
20 See WORLD'S MAJOR STOCK EXCHANGES/LISTING REQUIREMENTS 13 (1984); Gesetz Ober
das Kreditwesen [KWG](Banking Act), revised by BGBL.I 1121 (1976).
21 Frankfurt Stock Exchange Rules Relating to Admission of Securities, in H. BLOOMENTHAL,
INTERNATIONAL CAPITAL MARKETS AND SECURITIES REGULATION (1983).
22 AktG § 177. The basic corporate information is contained in the Handelsregister (commercial
register) which is maintained by each municipal court within the corporation's jurisdiction. All
forms of mercantile and industrial enterprises have to be registered in the Handelsregister and are
required to disclose basic corporate facts such as share capital, shareholders, articles of association
and by-laws, legal representatives of the firm, and members of the management and supervisory
boards. The Handelsregister is open to the public and any interested person may ask for official
certificates of entry and for certified copies of any document filed with it. Such registration consti-
tutes constructive notice to the public. Wegen, supra note 3, at 87.
23 A small minority of commentators argue that insider trading serves a useful purpose by more
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IV. ATTITUDES TOWARD INSIDER TRADING
In nineteenth-century Germany, investing money in stock was con-
sidered to be an affair for those educated in the ways of business and was
not intended for the public at large. The public was advised to invest its
savings in bonds and, in particular, government bonds. The law reflected
this attitude. Under the Civil Code of 1896, a guardian was allowed to
invest the money of a beneficiary in mortgages or government bonds, but
was prohibited from buying stock. The same was true for insurance
companies. Shares were considered to be a highly-speculative invest-
ment. As trading was considered to be only for sophisticated and well-
informed individuals who could protect themselves against the attendant
risks, regulation of insider trading was not an issue.24
After World War II, the United States introduced in Germany not
only the Marshall Plan, but also a new attitude toward the free market
economy. It was believed that by encouraging citizens to participate fi-
nancially in the economic system, they would have an increased interest
in supporting it. Such participation could be accomplished by widely
distributing capital ownership to the public. Consequently, public partic-
ipation in the German stock markets reached its peak in the mid-1960s.
In order to guarantee a functioning market economy and orderly
capital markets, it was also understood that certain legal structures had
to be imposed. Most post-War legal commentators in Germany have
come to realize that insider trading is harmful to the stock markets and
that businesses and managers should not be allowed to use sensitive in-
formation obtained by virtue of their position for private gain. The atti-
tude that insider trading is a perquisite of management is no longer
endorsed. As part of the legal rules necessary to ensure orderly markets,
German scholars and practitioners now generally accept the principle
that insider trading should be prevented.
gradually moving the market price of a given stock toward a level reflecting its true value, and thus
may be regarded as both a legitimate stimulant and reward for entrepreneurial ability. See, e.g., H.
MANNE, INSIDER TRADING AND THE STOCK MARKET (1966). However, the contention that in-
sider trading is desirable has been widely discredited. See, e.g., Mendelson, Tile Economics ofInsider
Trading Reconsidered (Book Review), 117 U. PA. L. REV. 470 (1969); Ferber, The Case Against
Insider Trading, A Response to Professor Manne, 23 VAND. L. REV. 621 (1970); Marsh, Book Re-
view, 66 MICH. L. REV. 1317 (1968)(reviewing H. MANNE, INSIDER TRADING AND THE STOCK
MARKET (1966)).
24 Address by Professor Coing of the University of Frankfurt, Second International Securities
Law Conference (Apr. 3-4, 1975), reprinted il MULTINATIONAL APPROACHES-CORPORATE INSID-
ERS 55, 121-22 (L. Loss ed. 1976)[hereinafter Coing Address].
25 Stocks lost their appeal among the German public after the first significant downturn in the
market. See J. JENKEI., supra note 5, at 18.
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V. CIVIL AND COMMON LAW APPROACHES TO INSIDER TRADING
Before examining the current insider trading code, it is useful to
examine briefly the possibility of applying German civil and common law
theories to incidences of insider trading. It should be noted at the outset,
however, that the German Civil and Criminal Codes contain no provi-
sions specifically addressing the issue of insider trading.
A. An Action under Contract or Tort Law
One way of evaluating the legality of insider trading is to consider
whether an insider is obligated under civil contract law to disclose infor-
mation before engaging in a securities transaction. Although the Ger-
man Civil Code2 6 has no specific rules in this respect, § 123 of the Code
states that deceit makes a contract voidable. In applying this section, the
courts have established the following principles: 1) a seller is not obli-
gated to a buyer to disclose fully all material facts about the sale as the
law recognizes that there is a conflict of interest between buyers and sell-
ers; and 2) whether a particular material fact known only to a seller must
be disclosed is to be determined in view of the circumstances of the case
and under the standards of good faith and general business practices.2 7
Legal commentators have concluded that, based on these principles, in-
siders would most likely be obligated to disclose to outsiders the particu-
lar material facts known to them prior to making a trade.28
These principles, however, have no practical application to insider
trading. The law requires there be privity between the seller and buyer, a
requirement which does not exist in most securities transactions. In
other words, common law rules regarding deceit would only apply in the
exceptional case where the buyer and seller conduct their business
outside the stock exchange and not through the agency of banks or bro-
kers. Legal scholars have also concluded that, because there is a lack of
privity in most securities transactions, an action in tort by a buyer
against a seller for failure to disclose inside information would most
likely fail.29
B. An Action for Breach of Fiduciary Duty
Article 93 of the Stock Corporation Act imposes civil liability on
26 BORGERLICHES GESETZBUCH [BGB](Civil Code)(1896), RGBL 195, amended by BGBL 553
(1981).
27 See Coing Address, supra note 24, at 56 (citing ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES REICHSGERICHTS IN
ZIVIISACHEN [RGZ] 111,233, at 234-35; RGZ 62,149, at 150; and RGZ 111,233, at 56).
28 Coing Address, supra note 24, at 57.
29 Id.
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members of the Vorstand (Board of Management) for failure to comply
with the requisite standard of care. Paragraph (1) states:
In managing the company, the members of the Board of Management shall
act with the care of a diligent and prudent executive. They shall keep secret
all confidential information and secrets of the company, especially business
and trade secrets, which have become known to them in connection with
their activities as members of the Board of Management.
Article 116 places members of the Aufsichtsrat (Supervisory Board)
under the same standard of care.3" Board members are jointly and sever-
ally liable to the corporation for damages caused by breach of their fidu-
ciary duty.
Because directors and managers are under a duty to keep secret con-
fidential information, it may be possible to apply this section to insider
trading cases, particularly if the insider has revealed confidential infor-
mation to a third party (i.e., to a so-called "tippee"). It is not clear,
however, whether this duty precludes an individual from using the infor-
mation for personal gain, as is common in insider trading cases.
31
Neither would it prevent individuals from trading in the stock of corpo-
rations for which they do not work and to which they owe no fiduciary
obligation. While a company can sue its directors and managers for
gains obtained from a breach of their fiduciary duty, it appears there has
been no court decision addressing this issue with respect to insider trad-
ing.3" It is also important to note that German law allows no derivative
shareholder actions.33
In sum, German civil and common law remedies do not provide
adequate tools for combating insider trading. Specific statutory-type
rules are necessary.
VI. THE VOLUNTARY INSIDER TRADING CODE
After much public debate in the mid-1960s over the need to reform
the stock exchange system to encourage wider distribution of shares
among the general public, the Federal Minister of Economics established
in 1968 the Commission of Stock Exchange Experts ("Commission") to
devise and implement necessary changes. In July 1969, the Commission
appointed a subcommittee under the direction of Professor Doctor Wolf-
30 AktG §§ 93, 116.
31 B. RIDER & H. FFRENCH, THE REGULATION OF INSIDER TRADING 243-47 (1979).
32 Coing Address, supra note 24, at 58.
33 The only provision allowing derivative-type actions is § 147 of the Stock Corporation Act,
which permits 10% of the shareholders to demand a damage action be brought by and on behalf of
the company against members of the Board of Managers and Supervisory Board whose acts have
injured the company. AktG § 147.
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gang Stutzel to look into the issue of insider trading. The regulation of
insider trading had become a controversial topic in Germany, particu-
larly in light of numerous reports of suspected insider trading abuses in
preceding years.
Based upon the recommendations of this subcommittee, the Com-
mission and the Minister of Economics unanimously adopted on Novem-
ber 13, 1970, a document entitled "Recommendations for the Solution of
the So-Called Insider Problems" ("Recommendations"). 34 In late 1971,
the Commission also adopted Rules of Procedure for the Boards of In-
quiry of the stock exchanges.
Faced with the need to provide greater flexibility and practicality,
the 1970 Recommendations were subsequently modified and extended by
the Insider Trading Guidelines of July 1, 1976 ("Guidelines"). 5 These
new Guidelines were based on the recommendations of the so-called
Committee of Stock Exchanges and the Federal Ministry of Finance.3 6
The Rules of Procedure were also modified in July 1976. 37
In adopting rules proscribing insider trading, the Commission mem-
bers clearly recognized the economic harm caused by such trading. The
Preamble of the Guidelines states:
The stock exchanges play an important role in the raising of financial capi-
tal for investment in the economy. The greater the confidence in the or-
derly transaction of stock exchange business, the more they are able to fulfil
this role. To this end, preventing the abuse of insider information plays a
significant role.
3 8
Despite the recognition that insider trading can cause long-term
damage to capital markets, the Commission of Stock Exchange Experts
and the federal government declined to make insider trading illegal, or
even subject to civil sanctions. Instead, the German authorities opted for
a unique system mixing voluntary compliance with self-regulation. Con-
sequently, the Guidelines and Rules of Procedure are characterized as
34 Empfehlungen der B'rsensachverstdndigenkommission beim Bundeswirtschaftsmninisterium zur
Losung der sogenannten Insider-Probleme, reprinted in R. BRUNS, WERTPAPIER UND BORSE § 435
(1976)[hereinafter Recommendations].
35 Insiderhandels-Richtlinien, reprinted in R. BRUNS, supra note 34, § 436 [hereinafter
Guidelines].
36 Participating organizations were the Federation of German Stock Exchanges, Federation of
German Industry, Federation of German National Banks and Natural Resource Banks, Federation
of German Wholesalers and Exporters, Federation of German Banks, German Federation of Savings
Banks, Federation of Insurance Companies, Federation of German Retailers, the Federation of Fed-
erated Business Banks, and the Federation of Public Banks.
37 Verfahrensordnung fiir die bei den Wertpapierbdrsen auf den Grundlage der Insiderhandels-
Richtlinien und der Hdndler- und Beraterregein voin 1. Juli 1976 zu bildenden Prdfungskonunis-
sioner, reprinted in R. BRUNS, supra note 34, § 438 [hereinafter Rules of Procedure].
38 Guidelines, supra note 35, at I.
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private law.3 9
By adopting a voluntary code designed to educate corporate execu-
tives and others to the harms and immorality of insider trading, the
Germans believed that they could more effectively control abusive insider
trading than by adopting a state-enforced system of statutory proscrip-
tion. This philosophy is summarized in the following Comment to the
Recommendations:
Because the Insider Recommendations employ private law means to en-
force a certain code of conduct, they and the Insider Rules of Procedure
contain, relative to general standards, no meaningful sanctions for
violations.
In my opinion, this particular defect is compensated to a large extent
by the fact that the Rules are recognized voluntarily and approved by the
professional community. Legal regulation would only be accepted reluc-
tantly and circumvented to the extent possible. Such regulation can cer-
tainly theoretically, but not practicably, be as effective as a rule by which
the behavior of the affected individuals is observed by professional col-
leagues as opposed to the more or less distant state authority.
Efforts in other countries to solve insider problems by legal means has led,
as far as can be seen, to only partial success. This was also to be expected
because it is practicably not possible to supervise carefully individuals for
all violations of the relevant regulations. 4°
The German approach relies on corporations and banks to obligate
contractually their top employees to abstain from insider trading and to
ensure that these prohibitions are not violated. Only when insiders have
bound themselves contractually to comply with the Guidelines are they
prohibited from engaging in insider trading.
Section 1 of the Guidelines establishes a blanket prohibition against
insiders trading on inside information. Specifically, insiders may "not
engage in dealings of 'inside securities' with the use of inside information
(which they obtained by virtue of their position), at any time, or under
any circumstances, for their own benefit or the benefit of a third party."
41
Third parties can include companies and other legal persons. There are a
number of exceptions to this general prohibition, including: 1) transac-
tions executed at the instruction of others (e.g., a broker's execution of an
order from a customer); 2) transactions involving the safeguarding of cli-
ents' interests and other transactions conducted in the normal course of
the bank's securities business; and 3) certain dealings based on long-term
business planning.42
39 Id. at 7 (Erlduterungen zu den Insiderhandels-Richtlinien (Vorbeinerkungen)).
40 Recommendations, supra note 34, at 8-9.
41 Guidelines, supra note 35, § 1(1), at 2.
42 Id. § 1(2).
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Under the formulation in the 1970 Recommendations, insiders in-
clude members and legal representatives of the management and supervi-
sory boards and those employees who routinely have access to certain
classes of sensitive information. The corporation itself decides whether
an individual has such access to be classified as an insider. The 1976
Guidelines expanded the concept of insider to include domestic share-
holders holding more than 25% of a company's stock. (If the 25%
shareholder is a company, then its directors and legal representatives are
considered insiders.) Directors and employees of affiliated enterprises,
under certain circumstances, may also fall within the definition of in-
sider. Although persons outside the corporation with inside information
were not initially covered under the 1970 Recommendations, the 1976
Guidelines were drafted to prohibit, in certain instances, insider trading
by banks and credit institutions and their directors, managers, and em-
ployees.43 Tippees are not covered by the Recommendations or the
Guidelines.
"Inside securities" encompass stocks, Genusscheine (participating
certificates), Wandel- und Gewinnschuldverschreibungen (convertible and
participating bonds), stock options, and Bezugsrechte (preemptive (sub-
scription) stock rights). However, the Insider Trading Regulations only
apply to those securities which are either officially listed on the stock
exchanges or traded on the semiofficial regulated market. 4 Corporations
whose shares are traded off the stock exchange on the market for nonreg-
ulated, unlisted transactions are not covered by the Regulations.
The scope of this general prohibition on insider trading is circum-
scribed, in large part, by the categories of information defined as inside
information. Section 2(3) of the Guidelines broadly defines insider infor-
mation as "knowledge about known and unknown circumstances which
can influence the valuation of insider securities."45 Specifically included
in the definition of insider information is knowledge of the following:
a) changes in dividend rates;
b) substantial changes in earnings or facts which may influence such
earnings;
c) actions taken to reduce or raise capital, including the raising of capital
from corporate resources;
d) conclusion of a direct-control contract or profit-sharing agreement;
e) takeover and settlement offers;
f) planned mergers, amalgamations, transfers of assets, and reorganiza-
tions; and
43 Id.
44 Id. § 2(2), at 3.
45 Id. § 2(3), at 4.
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g) dissolution of the company.
It is not important that the information be of a confidential nature. The
decisive element is whether the information was available to the public at
the time it was acted upon by the insider.
The Official Comment of the Guidelines reiterates the principle that
adherence to the insider trading rules is based on voluntary agreement
between an insider and the company. "[The Guidelines] are applicable
only when the individuals concerned have expressly recognized
them. ,46 This is usually effected by corporations inserting a specific
prohibitionary clause in the individual employee contracts of corporate
insiders. Where there is no employment contract, as for example with
members of an Aufsichtsrat, adherence to the Guidelines can be made a
term of appointment. Nonetheless, there is no legal requirement that a
company request its key employees to accept such an agreement. In fact,
a number of well-known German corporations have not adopted the in-
sider trading rules at all.47 As a result, employees in these companies,
like those whose shares are not traded on the official or semiofficial ex-
changes, are not prohibited from engaging in insider trading.
As the insider trading prohibition is based on a voluntary contrac-
tual agreement between an insider and the company, no legal or discipli-
nary action may be taken against an offender by any outside agency.
Section 4 specifically states that the Guidelines provide no sanctions for
breaches by insiders; they only provide a mechanism for establishing
whether a violation has occurred. Any action against insider trading
must be brought by the company against its employee (or board member)
for breach of contract (or term of appointment). Section 4, note 1 states:
Such violations [of the Guidelines] represent at the same time, a breach of
the contracts, which exist between the insider and the company. The action
a company takes based on this type of contractual violation is for [the com-
pany] to decide; the Insider Trading Guidelines contain no provisions in
this regard....
In the case of an insider trading violation, the company to which the
person was contractually bound by the Guidelines may recover the prof-
its made from the trade. In the case of a bank or credit institution (or
their directors, employees, or managers), profits must be forfeited to the
company whose securities were the subject of the insider transaction.
Profits from avoided losses are similarly subject to these rules.49 The
46 Id. at 7.
47 See text accompanying notes 60-61.
48 Guidelines, supra note 35, § 4 n.1, at 6.
49 Id. § 4 n.2.
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violator must also pay for the cost of the proceedings.5" Finally, should
the insider refuse to disgorge the ill-gotten profits to the harmed com-
pany, the Guidelines provide that the company may enforce its claim in
court. There are exceptions, however, if there are financial or other im-
portant mitigating circumstances relative to the insider."'
The Guidelines provide for the establishment of a Prifungskommis-
sion (Board of Inquiry) for each stock exchange to ensure that the insider
trading rules are carried out and to investigate allegations of abusive
trading.5" The jurisdiction and functioning of these boards (there are
currently eight) is prescribed in the Rules of Procedure.53
The Boards of Inquiry have five members each. The President must
be a judge experienced in commercial matters. The judge is nominated by
the President of the Oberlandesgericht (Supreme Court) and is then
elected by representatives of the leading federations associated with the
stock exchanges. The other four members are elected from federation
representatives, and at least two must be professionally involved with a
stock exchange. All appointments are for three years.
The board may open an inquiry on the basis of a complaint filed by
any individual, including one of self-accusation. The complaint must be
in writing and signed by the complainant and it must state facts that
clearly imply a violation of the rules. The name of the person who is
suspected of having committed the violation must also be given, as well
as the date on which the complainant discovered the violation. The
board is authorized to act only where the Guidelines may be applied to
the accused or the accused explicitly accepts them. Further, matters of
form must be strictly followed or the complaint will be rejected.5"
The board (which may act through a committee comprised of the
President and two other members) may conduct a preliminary inquiry to
decide if the available facts warrant a full investigation. During the pre-
liminary inquiry, documents and information may be collected from the
persons concerned and compelled from institutions. If a decision is made
to close a case, the board has the discretion to reopen it based on newly-
discovered evidence. The accused will be notified of an investigation, and
50 Rules of Procedure, supra note 37, § 5(2), at 7.
51 Guidelines, supra note 35, § 4(2), at 6. Pursuant to § 88(3) of the Stock Corporation Act, a
corporation must assert a claim against an insider for ill-gotten profits within three months of man-
agement's learning of the insider's obligation to pay. AktG § 88(3). The statute of limitations is five
years when there is no knowledge on the part of corporate management that such obligation exists.
Guidelines, supra note 35, § 4 n.2, at 6.
52 Id. § 3, at 5.
53 See generally Rules of Procedure, supra note 37.
54 B. RIDER & H. FFRENCH, supra note 31, at 246.
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a copy of the complaint will be furnished. Corporate representatives will
also be notified and required to assist in writing or through personal
testimony.
The Guidelines provide that, prior to the board issuing its formal
written findings, the accused must be shown the results of the investiga-
tion and allowed to present a defense either verbally or in writing. To
this end, the accused may collect and submit evidence as part of- a
defense.
The board will conclude in its formal findings as to whether there
has been a breach of the Insider Trading Guidelines. If such a violation
is found, the board will automatically charge the cost of the proceedings
to the violator. The board reports its findings only to the Federal Minis-
ter of Economics and to the relevant corporation together with the evi-
dence and the reasons for its findings. The decision is not published
unless the violator consents. However, if the violation is considered ex-
treme, publication may be made without the violator's consent."
A. Criticism of the Insider Trading Guidelines
The German approach to combating insider trading has been the
subject of extensive criticism by legal scholars and practitioners. 6 The
purpose of this section is to examine some of the important limitations
inherent in the current voluntary system. This examination will be fol-
lowed by a brief discussion of two cases in which the Guidelines have
been applied.
One of the major shortcomings of the Guidelines is that the defini-
tion of insider does not include a number of groups with access to inside
information. Under United States law, for example, corporate insiders
and tippees privy to material, nonpublic information are generally pro-
hibited from buying or selling securities based on that information prior
to its disclosure. 7 (The class of insiders for the purpose of this prohibi-
55 Rules of Procedure, supra note 37, § 5(3), at 7-8. Even in an extreme case, strict conditions
must be met before publication is allowed. The violator must be given a hearing, and the board's
decision must be unanimous and verified in writing. Publication must be shown to be in the public
interest. The board must also wait six weeks after notice has been given to the violator. Should the
violator file suit during this six-week period, the board must await the suit's final adjudication before
it can publish its findings. Id. § 5(7), at 8.
56 See, e.g., Hopt, supra note 9; R. WOJTEK, supra note 16; ARBEITSKRIES GESELLSCHAFT-
SRECHT, VERBOT DES INSIDERHANDELNS (1976); U. PFISTERER, MACHTMISSBRAUCH IM
WERTPAPIERHANDEL DURCH INSIDER: IMPLIKATIONEN FOR DIE BUNDESREPUBLIK DEUTSCH-
LAND AUS ERFAHRUNGEN IN DER USA (1976); Zahn, Regulation of Insider Trading in the Federal
Republic of Germany, 2 INT'L Bus. LAW. 92 (1974).
57 Sec. & Exch. Comm'n v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied,
404 U.S. 1005 (1971); Sec. & Exch. Comm'n v. Shapiro, 494 F.2d 1301 (2d Cir. 1971).
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tion includes not only directors, officers, and majority or controlling
shareholders, but also employees of the corporation who possess inside
information by virtue of their position.) Moreover, United States insider
trading rules apply to those outsiders standing in a fiduciary or agency
relationship to the sellers or purchasers of a company's securities.58
The German Guidelines, on the other hand, contain absolutely no
prohibition on trading by individuals who have insider knowledge but
fall outside the limited definition of insider. As a result, auditors, law-
yers, family members, customers, suppliers, and all other tippees with
access to inside information may engage in trading based on that infor-
mation. Similarly, employees who are not classified by the corporation
as insiders because they do not have routine access to inside information
are not prohibited from trading should confidential, nonpublic informa-
tion come across their desks. In addition, because insiders (except those
working for banks or credit institutions) are prohibited from engaging in
insider trading only in the stock of the corporation with which they have
contracted, they are free to trade in the securities of totally unrelated
companies. 9 This apparently would include, for example, stock in a
company subject to a takeover attempt by the corporation for which the
insider works. In short, the restricted and inflexible definition of insider
under the German Guidelines allows a large number of individuals with
access to inside information to escape the reach of the trading
prohibition.
A second shortcoming of the Guidelines is that the optional nature
of the trading code has allowed a number of stock corporations to reject
adoption of the Guidelines for their insider employees and board mem-
bers. Although by 1980 nearly 100% of the German banks had accepted
the insider rules, only slightly more than 50% of the stock corporations
had done so. (If counted on the basis of stated capital, stock corpora-
tions holding 95% of the total stated capital of all German corporations
had declared by 1980 that they would adhere to the Guidelines. 60 ) Der
Spiegel recently reported that 107 major German firms, including
Hochteif and Hussel, have still not adopted the Guidelines.6' Of course,
corporations which have accepted the Guidelines may later decide to re-
ject them.
Third, the securities covered by the Guidelines comprise only a
58 Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222 (1980).
59 However, banks and credit institutions (including their directors, managers, and employees)
are prohibited from using their inside knowledge to trade in securities of corporations involved in
takeover and compensation bids. See Guidelines, supra note 35, § 2(1), at 3.
60 Hopt, supra note 9, at 381.
61 DER SPIEGEL, Oct 28, 1985, at 25-26.
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small fraction of those issued by stock corporations. Only transactions in
shares admitted to the official stock exchanges or traded on the semioffi-
cial regulated markets are subject to the insider trading rules.6" This
means that insider trading is permissible in the shares of more than three-
quarters of the 2,000-plus German stock corporations. 63 This figure does
not take into consideration those stock corporations which could be sub-
ject to, but have refused to adopt, the Guidelines. Further, trading in
bonds (excluding convertible and participating bonds), limited partner-
ship interests, and other forms of securities are not covered by the insider
trading rules.
A fourth major shortcoming to the Guidelines is that the procedures
established for conducting an investigation of alleged trading abuse are
inadequate. Under the Guidelines, a Board of Inquiry may only open an
investigation when a signed complaint is submitted naming a particular
suspect and providing the date on which the alleged insider trade took
place. A Board of Inquiry is not authorized to initiate an investigation
on its own, even when there has been an unusual change in the price of a
given stock or a significant fluctuation in trading volume.' Perhaps
more important to the effectiveness of any probe is the fact that it is
customary in Germany for shares to be purchased in bearer form.
(Bearer securities are usually deposited in banks for safekeeping, thereby
giving the banks the voting rights of the stock.6 5) This system, com-
bined with strict German bank secrecy laws, makes it very difficult, if not
impossible, to determine who has purchased what stock.6 6 Der Speigel
summarized the current situation as follows:
Even when the stock exchange examiners make a serious effort to uncover
violations against the Guidelines, the chances [of catching the insiders] are
virtually nill. When an insider uses his informational advantage on the
stock market, he has almost nothing to fear. The reason is that his transac-
62 See Guidelines, supra note 35, § 2(2), at 3.
63 Hopt, supra note 9, at 381-82.
64 The Board of Inquiry made an exception to this rule in the Thyssen-Rheinstahl case when it
initiated an inquiry despite the fact that no formal complaint had been filed. See infra text accompa-
nying notes 71-72.
65 Banks are now obligated under the Public Companies Law to pass on information to share-
holders that has been supplied by the corporation. Moreover, a bank must disclose to shareholders
its intention regarding voting of the shares, and solicit the shareholders for their voting instructions.
If a shareholder does not respond, the bank may vote the shares as it sees fit. See B. RIDER & H.
FFRENCH, supra note 31, at 245. In light of the fact that many shareholders are not interested in
how their shares are voted and therefore do not respond to voting inquiries, the banks have been able
to retain tremendous influence over corporate boards. It is very common in Germany for nominees
of banks to sit on the boards of corporations (particularly the Aufsichtsrat (supervisory board)).
Because there is no law prohibiting interlocking directorates, these nominees are often directors and
officers of the banks at the same time.
66 B. RIDER & H. FFRENCH, supra note 31, at 245.
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tion orders go from bank to bank, and quite often institutions in Basel and
Zurich are used in between. The German purchasers remain anonymous;
thanks to bank secrecy, the inquiry remains in the dark.6 7
As a result, the chances of an insider being caught for prohibited trading
are very small. In fact, the Boards of Inquiry have never found a signifi-
cant violation of the Insider Trading Guidelines since their inception,
despite repeated allegations and reports of extensive insider trading.68
Finally, even if it were easy to uncover insider trading, the sanctions
are so mild that they have little or no deterrent effect. The Guidelines
require only that a violator disgorge to the injured company all profits
earned from the prohibited transaction and pay the cost of the inquiry
proceedings. No fines may be imposed and there are absolutely no crimi-
nal sanctions. Further, the decision to enforce any board finding is left
entirely to the discretion of the corporation; the Boards of Inquiry have
no enforcement powers.
Perhaps the greatest failing of the Guidelines, however, is the strict
limitation on the publication of any investigatory findings or decision of
the Boards of Inquiry, except in the most extreme cases, and then only
after numerous procedural requirements have been met. This procedure
almost ensures that violators will not be personally subject to profes-
sional or public disapproval of their actions, an important element in
establishing an effective deterrent. Consequently, the maximum risk an
insider faces for engaging in prohibited trading is paying the cost of the
proceedings plus the attendant inconvenience. Any profits which must
be returned to the corporation represent nothing more than unjust
enrichment.
In sum, the German Insider Trading Guidelines can be character-
ized, in the words of University of Munich Professor Doctor Michael
Will, as a "toothless device."69 It is therefore not at all surprising that
there have been only a handful of investigations conducted under the
Guidelines and that, with one minor recent exception, no one has ever
been held liable for insider trading even in the face of fairly strong prima
facie evidence that such trading had occurred.7 °
67 DER SPIEGEL, Oct. 28, 1985, at 25-26.
68 See text accompanying note 15, supra. In its investigation of the takeover bid of Daimler-
Benz for AEG, the Frankfurt Board of Inquiry found that a member of AEG's Supervisory Board
had committed a "minor insider trading violation." Insiderregeln, Handelsblatt, June 27-28, 1986.
69 Address by Dr. Michael Will, Second International Securities Law Conference (Apr. 3-4,
1975), reprinted in MULTINATIONAL APPROACHES-CORPORATE INSIDERS 195 (L. Loss ed. 1976).
70 See, e.g., Thyssen-Rheinstahl and Daimler-Benz-AEG investigations discussed infra at text
accompanying notes 71-80. The insider in the Daimler-Benz inquiry was asked to return to AEG his
profit of DM15,957 on the trade of 700 shares of AEG stock. Insiderregen, Handelsblatt, July 1986.
See generally text accompanying notes 78-80.
Insider Trading in Germany
7:507(1986)
B. Application of the Guidelines: Two Case Studies
This section will briefly consider two cases-the Thyssen takeover of
Rheinstahl and the Daimler-Benz purchase of AEG-which exemplify
the difficulties in applying the Insider Trading Guidelines.
1. Thyssen-Rheinstahl
The first major investigation under the Insider Trading Recommen-
dations occurred in 1973 as a result of the purchase by August Thyssen
Huette AG of Rheinstahl AG. The available evidence7' indicates that in
early November 1972, managers from Thyssen and Rheinstahl met to
discuss the possibility of greater cooperation between the companies. Af-
ter several months of negotiation, the companies agreed that Thyssen
would purchase 51% of Rheinstahl's securities. Thyssen completed the
takeover in February 1973. During this period of negotiation, the vol-
ume of trading in Rheinstahl securities increased significantly and the
market price of the stock rose to almost exactly that of the intended offer
price.
In response to considerable comment and speculation in the press,
the Dusseldorf Stock Exchange solicited allegations of insider abuse.
Although no complaint was ever filed with the Dusseldorf Exchange,
even after six major banks conducted internal investigations, the Chair-
man of the Exchange and the banks, with the consent of Thyssen, re-
quested the Board of Inquiry to initiate an investigation. The President
of the Inquiries Board, Judge Hans Naeke, agreed to conduct an investi-
gation despite the fact that he technically lacked jurisdiction to do so
because no complaint had been filed. Apparently Judge Naeke was will-
ing to proceed because the affected companies had agreed to the probe
and pledged their support.
The Board of Inquiry commissioned an independent chartered ac-
countant to conduct the fact-finding portion of the investigation and
questioned corporate representatives and others on its own. A total of
160 inquiries were made. The Board publicly concluded that, although
there had probably been instances of abusive dealing, there was no evi-
dence that the limited provisions of the Insider Recommendations had
been violated.72 One reason for this conclusion was that the rules did not
cover trading by insiders in the securities of unrelated companies. Trad-
ing by Thyssen executives in the stock of Rheinstahl was, therefore, not
71 See B. RIDER & H. FFRENCH, supra note 31, at 247; Coing Address, supra note 24, at 63;
Zahn, supra note 56, at 95.
72 B. RIDER & H. FFRENCH, supra note 31, at 247.
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prohibited. Although not required to do so, the Board subsequently pub-
lished its decision relating to the proceedings against Thyssen and Dres-
dner Bank AG.73
2. Daimler-Benz-AEG
A much more recent example of apparent insider trading occurred
in connection with the takeover bid by Daimler-Benz AG of AEG AG, a
large electrical and electronics firm. According to press reports, 74 on
Monday, October 7, 1985, the Chairman of AEG's Board of Directors
called his nineteen colleagues and invited them to attend a special meet-
ing on the following Sunday. The Board members were apparently told
that the meeting concerned Daimler's participation in AEG and that ab-
solute secrecy was required. The next day, the price of AEG stock
jumped from DM157 to DM174, an 11% increase. There was also a
huge increase in trading volume. During the last week in September,
daily volume of AEG stock traded in Frankfurt and Dusseldorf had
ranged between 9,000 and 31,000 shares. On October 8, 170,871 shares
of AEG changed hands on the Frankfurt Exchange and 176,539 in Dus-
seldorf. In short, AEG stock jumped 28% in the ten days prior to
Daimler's official takeover offer. (The Commerzbank Index rose just
over 1% during this same period.75) Daimler completed its purchase of a
56% stake in AEG in February 1986, after receiving approval from the
Federal Cartel Office.
The unexplained jumps in the price and volume of AEG stock
caused widespread concern. Hans Peter Schreib, head of the German
Association for the Protection of Shareholders, wrote to the Board of
Inquiry of the Frankfurt Stock Exchange demanding that an investiga-
tion be conducted. The President of the Frankfurt Exchange consented
to an inquiry, noting skeptically that "abuse by insiders is always
possible.
' 76
After four months of investigation, the Frankfurt Board of Inquiry,
headed by Friedrich-Carl zur Megede, reported its preliminary finding
73 Zahn, supra note 56, at 95 n.8 (citing DER BETRIEB 2288 & 2290 (1973)).
74 See DER SPIEGEL, Oct. 28, 1985, at 25-26; Wall St. J., Mar. 21, 1986 (European edition).
75 In fact, the price of AEG stock began to move upwards at the beginning of October after
discussions had taken place between the Daimler Board and the Chairman of AEG. On October 2,
the price of the stock jumped 9 points: daily trading volume on the Hamburg and Munich Ex-
changes increased ten fold, and trading of AEG stock on the Dusseldorf Exchange experienced a
300% increase in volume. Trading in AEG was suspended on October 11, 1985, prior to Daimler's
official announcement of its takeover bid. The price of AEG stock continued to climb after the
takeover bid was made public, reaching DM241 on October 25, 1985.
76 DER SPIEGEL, Oct. 28, 1985, at 28 (quoting Frankfurt Stock Exchange President Karl-Oskar
Koenigs).
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that "there were no pointers to infringements of insider trading rules."
The Wall Street Journal concluded at the time that, "[t]he [Board's] deci-
sion comes as little surprise.
7 7
On June 26, 1986, the Board of Inquiry concluded its investigation
of the Daimler-Benz-AEG case by finding, for the first time ever, that
there had been a violation-albeit a "minor" one-of the Insider Guide-
lines. As it was bound to secrecy, the Board refused to divulge publicly
any details about its findings, confirming only that it involved a single
violaton of insignificant magnitude.78
According to press reports, 79 Deutsche Bank AG, which sits on the
supervisory boards of both AEG and Daimler-Benz, applied pressure on
the boards to make a public statement about the findings after being em-
barrassed by a shareholder's question at Daimler-Benz's annual meeting.
It was also hoped that such a statement would end the considerable spec-
ulation by the public as to who had committed the violation. A few days
later, Dr. Klaus Kuhn acknowledged his responsibility for the insider
trade. Dr. Kuhn was Chairman of the Supervisory Board of AEG at the
time of the Daimler takeover. According to Dr. Kuhn, he had
purchased a total of 700 shares of AEG stock on September 12 and 20,
1985. These purchases were reportedly made on the recommendation of
Dr. Kuhn's bank based on technical chart evaluations. Dr. Kuhn sold
the stock in October 1985 for a profit of DM15,957.
During the investigation, Dr. Kuhn informed the Board of Inquiry
of his transactions. The Board found that the purchases constituted a
"minor" violation of the Guidelines, noting that, as a member of AEG's
Supervisory Board, Dr. Kuhn presumably had knowledge of the takeover
discussions being held by AEG and Daimler. According to the Board,
Dr. Kuhn should therefore not have followed the recommendation of his
bank to buy the stock. He subsequently returned the profits he had made
from the trade to AEG. No fine or other costs were imposed on Dr.
Kuhn for this "minor" violation. 0
The incidences described above represent two of the more spectacu-
lar cases of apparent insider trading in the German markets. Both inves-
tigations were initiated based upon very strong prima facie evidence that
77 Wall St. J., Mar. 21, 1986.
78 Insiderregeh, Handelsblatt, June 27-28, 1986.
79 Wall St. J., Aug. 21, 1986, at 22, col. 2.
80 Insiderregeh, Handelsblatt, July 7, 1986. Dr. Kuhn asserted that he saw no reason not to
follow his bank's recommendation given the very general nature and nonbinding character of the
talks between Daimler-Benz and AEG at that time. Dr. Kuhn also contended that in light of the
small size of his investment and the fact that the impetus for the purchase came from his bank, it was
clear that he had no intention of violating the Insider Trading Guidelines. Id.
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considerable insider trading had taken place. Nonetheless, the conclu-
sions of the Boards of Inquiry that there had been no significant viola-
tions of the Guidelines were virtually preordained. Simply put, one can
not expect to effectively detect, punish, and deter insider trading of Ger-
man securities under a system which lacks investigatory tools and mean-
ingful sanctions and which defines violations in extremely narrow terms.
VII. PROSPECTS FOR REFORM
A. Domestic Reform
Despite repeated press reports of insider trading and criticisms of-
fered by legal scholars, there appears to be little movement within the
German government or by the stock exchanges to institute significant
structural reforms to the current Insider Trading Guidelines. In fact, a
number of authorities believe the current self-regulatory system is supe-
rior to legal controls. Judge Kissel, former president of the Board of
Inquiry of the Frankfurt Exchange, warned in a public statement in De-
cember 1980 that enforcement of an insider law by a state agency or by
the courts would be completely inefficient, similar to the prosecution of
white-collar crime in general.81 Supporters of the current system also
contend that insider trading can only be effectively controlled by
strengthening the moral code among corporate executives and not by
state agencies.82
The German financial establishment has recently been put on the
defensive as a result of pressure from the EEC and the United States to
crack down on insider trading. Nevertheless, German business and gov-
ernment leaders still contend that the voluntary code is workable, and
even preferable, to legal restraint. Werner Jentsch, a director of the West
German Banking Association, responded to the foreign criticism by stat-
ing: "It's a high price to pay for international legal cooperation if we
have to give up this system of self-regulation .... We would regret it." 3
Another senior Frankfurt banker complained that "the international bu-
reaucrats want to regulate everything .... We'd rather have free capital
markets, even if it means tolerating a few peccadilloes." 84 The results of
the Daimler-Benz-AEG investigation appear to have reinforced the be-
lief among many that the current voluntary code is adequate, despite the
fact that the Board found only a minor violation involving 700 shares.
Mr. zur Megede, who headed the investigation, maintains that the
81 Hopt, supra note 9, at 382 (citing comments of Judge Kissel).
82 See Coing Address, supra note 24, at 126-27.
83 Wall St. J., Aug. 21, 1986, at 26, col. 2.
84 Id.
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Board's discovery "shows that the insider trading guidelines are quite
serviceable.""5
Furthermore, there appears to be little political support today for
establishing a German equivalent of the SEC, particularly in light of the
current atmosphere of distrust of government bureaucracies and the gen-
eral movement towards decentralization. Any changes to the German
rules will, therefore, most likely come about as part of the current at-
tempt by the EEC to harmonize insider trading legislation among the
Member States.
B. EEC Harmonization Efforts
The 1957 Treaty of Rome, which sets forth the principles governing
the EEC, establishes the movement of capital as one of the four basic
freedoms within the Community.86 To give meaning to this freedom, the
Commission of the EEC has undertaken measures to facilitate the crea-
tion of a common capital market among the Member States. This has
included promoting "interpenetration" of the various national capital
markets by encouraging investors to trade in securities offered on the
markets of other states. Interpenetration will not occur, however, if
there is a wide divergence in the efficiency and fairness of national mar-
kets. The Community has come to recognize that insider trading under-
mines the integrity of securities markets and therefore has a deleterious
effect on the creation of a common capital market.
8 7
Among the Member States,88 legislation prohibiting insider trading
currently exists only in France and the United Kingdom. Germany, as
discussed previously, has adopted a voluntary code. (Belgium and The
Netherlands are currently considering some form of insider trading legis-
lation.89) Consequently, the protection offered to investors against in-
sider abuse varies widely among the stock markets throughout the EEC.
As part of its company law harmonization program, the Commis-
sion is currently considering whether it should impose some minimum
degree of coordination to address this variance in insider trading stan-
dards among the Member States.9" The Commission has convened a
85 Id.
86 The other three freedoms concern movement of goods, services, and people. Treaty Establish-
ing the European Economic Community, Mar. 25, 1957, art. 3, 298 U.N.T.S. 3 (Treaty of Rome).
87 Cruickshank, Insider Trading in the EEC, 10 INT'L Bus. LAW. 345, 346 (1982).
88 There are currently twelve Community members: Belgium, Italy, The Netherlands, Luxem-
bourg, France, The Federal Republic of Germany, The United Kingdom, Ireland, Denmark,
Greece, Spain, and Portugal.
89 See Cruickshank, supra note 87, at 346.
90 Since the mid-1960s, the EEC has been pursuing a harmonization of laws program in a com-
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Working Group9 ' which met for the first time in June 1985 to draw up a
preliminary convention on insider trading. The aim of any insider trad-
ing rule would be to provide a minimum level of protection for all inves-
tors throughout the Community.
It is still uncertain whether agreement can be reached in the Work-
ing Group and at the Commission level on the need for insider trading
regulations in the Community and the form these requirements should
take. The current mood among German authorities indicates that Ger-
many will object to any broad prohibitory convention.
Should the Commission officially adopt a convention on insider
trading as a formal proposal, the Council of Ministers would still have to
approve it. Council approval would result in the issuance of a Directive
which would be binding on all the Member States.92 The entire approval
process, however, could take many years to complete.
VIII. CONCLUSION
The development of the German capital markets has lagged far be-
hind the industrialization of the country. This situation has adversely
affected the ability of German corporations to finance their expansion
through equity capital, forcing them to be overly dependent on banks
and debt financing. One way of developing and strengthening the Ger-
man capital markets is to increase their attractiveness to the individual
outside investor. This is dependent, in part, on demonstrating that there
is equal opportunity for all market participants. Effective control of in-
sider trading would be an important step in this direction.
The purpose of this Article has been to examine the structure and
effectiveness of the insider trading code currently in effect in the Federal
Republic of Germany. Notwithstanding the well-meaning intentions of
its authors, the current voluntary code apparently has not been and can-
not be effective in deterring and punishing insider trading abuses. If the
German authorities are serious in their desire to prevent insider trading,
prehensive effort to protect employees, shareholders, creditors, investors, and the public against cer-
tain types of corporate misconduct. A number of directives have already been issued by the Council
addressing such issues as public disclosure of corporate information, the validity of corporate acts,
activities and responsibilities of public stock companies, and rules regulating mergers. Several other
directives are still under consideration. An effort to harmonize insider trading rules is also part of the
program. See Note, Insider Trading and the EEC: Harmonization of the Insider Trading Laws of the
Member States, 8 B.C. INT'L & COMP. L. REv. 151, 166 (1985).
91 The group is known as The Working Party of the Committee of Experts on Insider Trading.
92 Directives, however, are fairly flexible because they only require that a certain result be ob-
tained within a defined period (usually two years), thereby allowing national governments the free-
dom to choose how they will implement the Directives.
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significant structural reforms will have to be instituted. To this end, seri-
ous consideration should be given to adopting a statutory scheme similar
to those in force in France, the United Kingdom, Japan, and the United
States. Failure to prevent insider abuses will only serve to injure the
long-term interests of German industry and society.
